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Williams: Class v. United States 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018)

Class v. United States
138 S. Ct. 798 (2018)
I. INTRODUCTION
“Roughly 95% of felony cases in the federal and state courts are resolved
by guilty pleas. Therefore, it is critically important that defendants,
prosecutors, and judges understand the consequences of these pleas.”1
Although a conviction entered on a plea of guilty cannot ordinarily be
reviewed by appellate proceedings except by reason of jurisdictional defects,
some jurisdictions extend to criminal defendants the right to appellate review
of their convictions based on guilty pleas.2 Criminal defendants may, in
several ways, lose or waive whatever rights to appeal are granted to them.3
Where, in a negotiated plea agreement, a defendant expressly waives the right
to appeal in order to obtain certain concessions from the state, the courts have
reached differing results as to the validity of such a waiver.4
Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized and endorsed
plea bargaining so long as the defendant is not coerced or oppressed by the
process, it has been held in some cases that a defendant’s waiver of the right
to appeal, as part of such a plea agreement, can never be valid because it
impermissibly chills the defendant’s right to have the proceedings which
resulted in a conviction reviewed, and it has also been held that such a waiver
was invalid only under the circumstances presented.5 On the other hand, the
validity of such express waivers has been upheld based upon evidence that
the negotiated plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly.6
In the 2018 Supreme Court case of Class v. United States, the validity of
waivers within plea agreements was again before the Court, with the main
issue being whether a guilty plea, in accordance with a plea bargain and
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 11, bars a criminal defendant from
later appealing their conviction on the ground that the statute of conviction
violated the Constitution.7 Class illustrated more than anything else that the

1. Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 807 (2018).
2. Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Validity and Effect of Criminal Defendant’s Express Waiver of Right
to Appeal as Part of Negotiated Plea Agreement, 89 A.L.R.3d 864 at 2a (2018) (quoting Am. Jur. 2d,
Appeal and Error § 271).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (where the court concluded that it was not
unconstitutional for the state to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to
the state); see also Cordier Karnezis, supra note 2.
6. See Cordier Karnezis, supra note 2.
7. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802-3.
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law dealing with plea agreement waivers seems to be straightforward, but at
the same time, conflicts with case law and precedent established by the Court.
The Court reaffirmed what has been called the Menna-Blackledge
doctrine and its basic teaching that “a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive
a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may not
constitutionally prosecute.”8 The law seems to be straightforward, if the
State may not constitutionally prosecute, then a criminal defendant does not
waive his right to an appeal. The conflict with plea bargains occurs when the
Menna-Blackledge doctrine is compared to the “Brady Trilogy” cases which
were discussed in Justice Alito’s dissent.9 The “Brady Trilogy” essentially
reiterated the Court’s general thinking “when a plea agreement is done
voluntarily and understandingly, then even a layman should expect the plea
of guilty to be treated as an honest confession of guilt and a waiver of all
defenses known and unknown. And such is the law.”10
The question then is, what is the law dealing with plea agreements and
what can a defendant appeal, or what are they entitled to waive? The majority
in Class held that a guilty plea does not bar a claim on appeal where on the
face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose
the sentence because Class was not going to introduce any new information
outside of the plea bargain.11 Therefore, a criminal defendant does not waive
his right to appeal an unconstitutional statute that convicted them after
pleading guilty when charged under an unconstitutional statute.12 The dissent
diverged and focused on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and the “Brady Trilogy,” essentially claiming that Class waived his right to
appeal when he plead guilty.13
In light of Class, the law dealing with plea bargains remains conflicting
and confusing. The Menna-Blackledge doctrine is alive and well.14 While
defendants will view Class as a victory for their waiver rights, prosecutors
will be left confused and conflicted on what to include in plea bargains.15
Therefore, the implications of Class are yet to be seen upon plea bargains but
will likely force prosecutors to add more explicitly waived rights within the
plea.16
8. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975); see
also United States v. Broce, 488 U. S. 563 (citing Menna, 423 U.S., at 63, n. 2).
9. See Class, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 810 (quoting Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, 709 (D.C. Cir., 1958).
11. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802.
12. Id. at 803.
13. See generally id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
14. See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 804.
15. See id. at 816 (Alito, J., dissenting).
16. See generally Lee v. United States, CV-16-8138-PCT-JAT (JFM); CR-05-0594-PCT-JAT,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113441 at 20 (D. AZ. July 6, 2018) (comparing how Class did not have explicit
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner Rodney Class was indicted by a federal grand jury for violating
40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1).17 The violation was for possessing firearms in his
locked jeep, which was parked in a lot on the grounds of the United States
Capitol in Washington, D.C.18 Thereafter, Class appeared pro se and asked
the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia to dismiss the
indictment because 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e) violated the Second Amendment and
his due process because he was denied fair notice that weapons were banned
from the parking lot of the Capitol grounds.19 The District Court denied both
claims.20 Class eventually plead guilty to possession of a firearm on U.S.
Capitol grounds in a plea agreement where the Government agreed to drop
related charges.21
The written plea agreement between Class and the government set forth
the terms of his guilty plea including several rights that he expressly agreed
to waive and expressly enumerated categories that he could raise on appeal.22
Additionally, the plea agreement said nothing about the right to raise on direct
appeal a claim that the statute of conviction was unconstitutional.23
The District Court held a plea hearing to review the terms of the
agreement and ensure its validity.24 After finding that the agreement was
sufficient and valid, the District Court accepted Class’ guilty plea and he was

waivers within the plea bargain being discussed and how most constitutional challenges continue to be
waived).
17. 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1) (2009). The complete text reads:
(e) Capitol Grounds and Buildings security.
(1) Firearms, dangerous weapons, explosives, or incendiary devices. An individual
or group of individuals(A) except as authorized by regulations prescribed by the Capitol Police
Board—
(i) may not carry on or have readily accessible to any individual on the
Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings a firearm, a dangerous
weapon, explosives, or an incendiary device;
18. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Id. (Rights expressly waived: (1) all defense based upon the statute of limitations; (2)
several specified trial rights; (3) the right to appeal a sentence at or below the judicially determined,
maximum sentencing guideline range; (4) most collateral attacks on the conviction and sentence; and (5)
various rights to request or receive information concerning the investigation and prosecution of his
criminal case. Expressly enumerated rights that Class could raise on appeal: (1) newly discovered
evidence; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) certain statutes providing for sentence reductions).
23. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802.
24. Id. See also FED. R. CRIM. P 11(b) and United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)
(defendant’s guilty plea must be voluntary and related waivers must be made knowingly, intelligently, and
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and consequences).
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sentenced.25 Class appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit where he repeated his constitutional claims that
the statute violated the Second Amendment and the Due Process Clause
because it failed to provide fair notice of where firearms were not allowed.26
The Court of Appeals held that Class could not raise his constitutional claims
because he waived them when he plead guilty.27 The Supreme Court granted
a writ of certiorari to determine whether, in pleading guilty, a criminal
defendant inherently waived the right to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute that convicted them.28
III. THE COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE
A. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch and Chief Justice Roberts, began by declaring
upfront that a guilty plea by itself does not bar a defendant from appealing
their conviction later on the ground that the statute of conviction was
unconstitutional.29 Justice Breyer reaffirmed the holding after the recitation
of facts and procedural history and declared that Class did not relinquish his
right to appeal constitutional determinations by pleading guilty.30 “[A]
defendant’s plea of guilty did not . . . waive their previous constitutional
claim.”31 Justice Breyer commented that Justice Harlan’s opinion in Haynes
v. United States did not offer a real explanation of what he meant, but added
that subsequent decisions by the Court, Blackledge v. Perry32 and Menna v.
New York,33 clarified the quote that offered a rationale that applied to the
present case.34
Citing the above cases of Blackledge and Menna, Justice Breyer
discussed what the Court has labeled as the Menna-Blackledge doctrine.35 In
Blackledge, North Carolina indicted and convicted Jimmy Perry on a
misdemeanor assault charge.36 When Perry exercised his right under a North
Carolina law for a de novo trial in a higher court, the State reindicted him
25. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802. (Class was sentenced to 24 days imprisonment followed by 12 months
of supervised release).
26. Id. at 802.
27. Id. at 803.
28. Id.
29. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802.
30. Id. at 803.
31. Id. (quoting Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 (1968)).
32. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
33. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975).
34. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 803.
35. See id. at 803-04.
36. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 22.
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with a felony for the same conduct.37 Perry plead guilty and then sought
habeas relief asserting that the reindictment was unconstitutional because of
vindictive prosecution.38 The Supreme Court held that a defendant who plead
guilty could challenge their conviction on the ground that their right to due
process was violated by a vindictive prosecution.39
In Menna, the defendant served a 30-day jail term for refusing to testify
before a grand jury.40 Later on, the State of New York charged him once
again for the same crime.41 Menna plead guilty but appealed, arguing that the
new charge violated the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution.42 The
lower courts held that Menna’s constitutional claim had been waived by his
guilty plea.43 The Supreme Court held that a defendant who pleaded guilty
could challenge his conviction on double jeopardy grounds.44
Therefore, the Menna-Blackledge doctrine has taught that a guilty plea
does not bar a claim on appeal where on the face of the record the court had
no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence.45 Justice Breyer
noted that in recent years the Court reaffirmed and refined the doctrine and
its scope in United States v. Broce.46 In Broce, the defendants plead guilty to
two different indictments in a single proceeding which described two separate
conspiracies.47 The two defendants later challenged their convictions on
double jeopardy grounds, arguing that they only admitted to one conspiracy.48
The Court held that because the defendants could not prove their claim by
relying on the indictments and the existing record and without contradicting
the indictments that their claims were foreclosed by the admissions inherent
in their guilty pleas.49 Broce refined Menna-Blackledge by holding a guilty
plea does not bar a claim on appeal where the defendant can rely on the record
and not contradict the terms of the indictment by bringing facts from outside
the record.50

37. Id. at 22-3.
38. Id. at 23.
39. See Blackledge, 471 U.S. at 22-3 (where the defendant was indicted and convicted on a
misdemeanor charge, later exercised his right to a de novo trail in a higher court, and the State reindicted
him for a higher charge of felony for the same conduct).
40. Menna, 423 U.S. at 61
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 62.
44. See Menna, 423 U.S. at 62-63.
45. Broce, 488 U.S. at 569.
46. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 804.
47. Broce, 488 U.S. at 565.
48. Id. at 567.
49. Id. at 576.
50. See Broce, 488 U.S. at 575-76.
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Justice Breyer compared Class’ claims to those in Broce.51 He noted that
Class’ constitutional claims did not contradict the terms of the indictment or
the written plea agreement, unlike the claims in Broce.52 They were
consistent with Class’ knowing, voluntary, and intelligent admission that he
did what the indictment alleged, and the claims could be resolved without any
need to go outside the record.53 Justice Breyer also noted that Class’ claims
were not focused upon case-related constitutional defects that occurred prior
to the entry of the guilty plea.54 Justice Breyer summed up his case analysis
by stating that the claims at issue in the case did not fall within any of the
categories of claims that Class’ plea agreement forbade him to raise on
appeal, but that the claims challenged the government’s power to
constitutionally prosecute him.55 Therefore, Class was able to pursue his
constitutional claims on appeal and the Court reversed the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.56
B. Majority Opinion Distinguishing Government’s and Dissent’s
Arguments
Justice Breyer felt the need to address Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion
and the main arguments that the Government asserted during oral argument.57
The government put forth three main arguments: first, that by entering a
guilty plea, Class inherently relinquished his constitutional claims; second,
both the Government and Justice Alito pointed to Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which govern “conditional” guilty pleas, and
both asserted that the rule should apply in the case; and third, the Government
argued that Class “expressly waived” his right to appeal his constitutional
claim.58
Addressing the first argument, Justice Breyer pointed out that the
Government was correct; a guilty plea does implicitly waive some claims,
including some constitutional claims; however, he asserted that he fully
explained in his analysis that Class’ valid guilty plea did not, by itself, bar
direct appeal of his constitutional claims in these circumstances.59 Justice
Breyer listed the rights that a valid guilty plea does waive, and then noted that
the rights do not include a waiver of privileges that exist beyond the confines
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Class, 138 S. Ct. at 804.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 804-05. (Comparing Class to Blackledge).
Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 805.
See id. at 805-06.
Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805.
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of a trial.60 In doing so, Justice Breyer asserted that Class’ right to appeal his
conviction could not in any way be characterized as part of a trial.61
Additionally, Justice Breyer went on to list certain things that cannot be
appealed by stating a valid guilty plea prevents the defendant from appealing
the constitutionality of case-related government conduct that takes place
before the plea is entered, and neither can a defendant later appeal that the
indicting grand jury was unconstitutionally selected, and that a valid guilty
plea relinquishes any claim that would contradict the admission made upon a
voluntary plea of guilty.62 Justice Breyer reaffirmed that none of those claims
were at issue in Class,63 but noted Class’ constitutional claims at issue were
consistent with his admission that he engaged in the conduct alleged, unlike
the defendants in Broce.64 Like the defendants in Blackledge and Menna,
Class sought to raise a claim based on the existing record that would
extinguish the government’s power to constitutionally prosecute him, and he
did not attempt to proffer evidence from outside the record.65
Next, Justice Breyer addressed the second argument put forth by the
Government and the dissent, that Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure should govern the conditional guilty plea and resolve the
issue of the case.66 The Government and the dissent argued Rule 11(a)(2)
meant that a defendant who plead guilty could not challenge their conviction
on appeal on forfeitable or waivable grounds that they either failed to present
to the district court or failed to reserve in writing.67 Justice Breyer noted that
the dissent pointed to the suggestion that an unconditional guilty plea
constituted a waiver of “nonjurisdictional defects,” while the Government
pointed to the statement that drafters intended the Rule’s plea procedure to

60. See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805 (quoting Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 628-629 (“A valid guilty plea forgoes
not only a fair trial, but other constitutional guarantees.”); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466
(1969) (“[S]imultaneously relinquished rights include the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
the jury trial, and the right to confront accusers.”)).
61. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805 (citing Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012)).
62. See id. (citing, Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 321 (1983); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258, 266 (1973); Broce, 488 U.S. at 573-74).
63. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805.
64. See Broce, 488 U.S. at 565 (defendants denied engaging in the conduct alleged in the
indictment).
65. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805-06.
66. See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 806, see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2) states:
Conditional Plea. With the consent of the court and the government, a defendant may enter a
conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to have an appellate
court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails
on appeal may then withdraw the plea.
67. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 806.
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conserve prosecutorial and judicial resources to ensure the speedy trial
objective and supporting uniformity within the federal system.68
The Government added that its interpretation of the Rule was that a
defendant must use Rule 11(a)(2) to preserve a Fourth Amendment unlawful
search-and-seizure claim; therefore, a defendant must use the Rule to
preserve the constitutional claim at issue in Class.69 Justice Breyer
commented that the problem with the Government’s argument was that the
Rule itself did not set forth the procedure for a defendant to preserve a
constitutional claim following a guilty plea, and at the same time the drafters
acknowledged that the Court has held certain kinds of constitutional
objections could be raised after a plea of guilty.70 Furthermore, Justice Breyer
pointed out that the advisory notes specifically refer to the Menna-Blackledge
doctrine, and they specify that the Rule should not be interpreted as either
broadening or narrowing the doctrine, and that Rule 11(a)(2) has no
application to the kinds of constitutional objections that may be raised under
the doctrine.71 Justice Breyer emphasized that the applicability of the MennaBlackledge doctrine was at issue in the case, and he relied on Broce where
that case acknowledged Menna and Blackledge as covering claims that on the
face of the record, the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose
the sentence.72 He declared that Rule 11(a)(2) could not resolve the case.73
Finally, Justice Breyer addressed the third argument of the Government,
that Class expressly waived his right to appeal his constitutional claim.74 He
made a point in his analysis to show that the Government concede that the
written plea agreement between Class and the Government did not contain
the expressed waiver.75 Instead, the Government relied on the statement by
the district court judge during the plea colloquy that under the written plea
agreement, Class gave up his right to appeal his conviction and that he agreed
to the statement.76 Justice Breyer disagreed with that argument by the
Government and asserted that the statement by the district court judge was
made to ensure that Class understood the terms of any plea agreement
provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.77
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Class, 138 S. Ct. at 806.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Class, 138 S. Ct. at 807.
Id.
Id. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N), which states:

Advising and Questioning the Defendant. Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the defendant may be placed under oath, and the court must address the defendant
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Concluding, Justice Breyer held that under the circumstances, Class’
agreement neither expressly nor implicitly waived his right to appeal his
constitutional claims; therefore, he could pursue his claims on direct appeal.78
C. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Alito
Justice Alito, with whom Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined, dissented
from the majority’s analysis and rationale pertaining to the Court’s use of the
Menna-Blackledge doctrine.79 Justice Alito disagreed with how the Court
came to its conclusion and proclaimed that the majority provided no clear
answer and left the area of law muddled by its decision pertaining to what
claims a defendant can raise on appeal after entering a guilty plea.80 He
claimed that the issue before the Court was not complex and all the majority
needed to do was answer three simple questions: (1) whether the Federal
Constitution precluded waiver; (2) if permitted, whether some other law
barred waiver; and (3) if not barred by another law, whether the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived their right to raise the claim on appeal.81
Answering the first question, Justice Alito argued that the Constitution
does not prohibit the waiver of the rights that Class asserted, and the Court
has held that most personal constitutional rights may be waived.82
Additionally, Justice Alito proclaimed that there is no federal statute or rule
that bars waiver.83 Lastly, the question of whether Class voluntarily and
intelligently waived his rights was not within the scope of the question of law
on which the Court granted certiorari and the majority did not decide the case
on that ground, so Justice Alito did not address it.84
Justice Alito turned his attention to the majority’s reliance on the MennaBlackledge doctrine.85 He asserted that Blackledge and Menna represented
departures from prior decisions and that the Court’s precedents were clear,
that “when a defendant plead guilty to a crime, he relinquished his right to
litigate all challenges to his conviction (except for the claim that his plea was
not voluntary and intelligent), and the prosecution could assert this forfeiture
to defeat a subsequent appeal.”86 He noted that the theory was easy to
personally in open court. During this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and
determine that the defendant understands, the following: (N) the terms of any plea agreement
provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Class, 138 S. Ct. at 807.
Id. at 807 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 807-08 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970)).
Class, 138 S. Ct. at 808 (citing Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936-937 (1991)).
Id.
Id. at 809.
Id.
Class, 138 S. Ct. at 809 (quoting Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267).
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understand and the Court’s view was asserted in Tollett v. Henderson,87 “a
guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in
the criminal process.”88
Furthermore, the defendant’s decision to plead guilty ended their right to
litigate any defense or constitutional claim they might have pursued at trial
or on appeal.89 Justice Alito further asserted that guilty pleas were understood
to include both factual and legal concessions, and that the Court stated in
Tollett that a defendant who plead guilty was barred from contesting not only
facts, but also the constitutional significance of those facts, even if they failed
to appraise that significance at the time of their plea.90
Justice Alito next declared that when Tollett declared that a guilty plea
encompassed all legal and factual concessions needed to authorize the
conviction, it was just reemphasizing the Court’s precedent in the so-called
“Brady Trilogy.”91 The Brady Trilogy consists of Brady v. United States,
Parker v. North Carolina, and McMann v. Richardson.92 The trilogy can be
summed up in the holding noted from Tollett but can also mean that a plea of
guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various
acts; it is itself a conviction, and nothing remains but to give judgment and
determine punishment.93 On the strength of that rule, Justice Alito noted that
the Court’s precedent held defendants who plead guilty forfeited a variety of
constitutional claims.94 That is where the law stood before the decision
handed down in Class.95
Justice Alito concluded that the majority, instead of clarifying the law,
actually sowed new confusion by parroting the rule set out in MennaBlackledge that the only arguments waived by a guilty plea are those that
contradict the facts alleged in the charging document, even though that rule

87. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
88. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 809 (quoting Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267).
89. Id.
90. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 809.
91. Id. at 810.
92. See id. at 810. See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“[T]he plea is more
that an admission of past conduct; it is the defendant’s consent that judgement of conviction be entered”);
McMann v. Richardson, 397, U.S. 759, 774 (1970) (“a defendant who pleads guilty assumes the risk of
error in either his or his attorney’s knowledge of the law and facts”); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S.
790, 797 (1970) (similar to McMann).
93. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 810 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395, U.S. 238, 242 (1969)).
94. See id. at 810. See generally Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266 (holding that a defendant who pleaded
could not attack their conviction on the ground that the prosecution violated the Equal Protection Clause
by excluding African-Americans from grand juries); McMann, 397 U.S. at 768 (holding that a defendant
could not argue that the prosecution unlawfully coerced their confession, even if the confession was the
only evidence supporting conviction); Brady, 397 U.S. at 756-57 (holding that a defendant could not assert
that his statute of conviction employed an unconstitutional penalty provision; his consent to be punished
under the statute precluded this defense).
95. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 814.
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is inconsistent with Tollett and the Brady Trilogy.96 Justice Alito alluded that
a reading of the decision in Class would permit a defendant who pleads guilty
to raise an uncertain assortment of claims never before thought to survive a
guilty plea.97 Summing up, he asserted that the governing law in Class is
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and under that rule, an
unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional claims with the possible
exception of the Menna-Blackledge doctrine.98 Justice Alito then concluded
that the doctrine is “vacuous, and has no sound foundation, and produces
nothing but confusion” and at a minimum, would limit the doctrine to the
particular of claims involved in those cases and certainly would not expand
its reach.99
IV. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
In 1970, the Court explained in Brady that guilty pleas serve a number of
public policies and that the State may justifiably extend a benefit to a
defendant who has extended a benefit to the State.100 By pleading guilty, a
defendant can obtain concessions in his probable penalty, begin the
correctional process, and be rid of the burdens of a trial.101 For the State,
avoiding a trial preserves scarce resources so that they can be used in cases
dealing with substantial questions.102 For these reasons, and others, the Court
had encouraged fair plea bargaining and a waiver of certain rights.103
To comport with due process, the Court required that waivers of
constitutional rights in guilty pleas be voluntary, knowing, intelligent acts
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.104 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides additional guidelines.105 Within the guidelines the trial courts must
determine that the defendant understands their guilty plea, waives certain
constitutional rights, and that the plea was not a result of force or threat.106
Even in the absence of express waivers, a guilty plea constitutes an admission
of factual guilt that forfeits a defendant’s ability to raise many, not all, claims
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 816.
99. Class, 138 U.S. at 816.
100. Alexandra W. Reimelt, Note, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains And Waiver Of The Right To
Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV. 871, 874 (May, 2010) (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 752-53).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 875.
104. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
105. See FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).
106. See id. at 11(b)(1) (A)-(F) and (b)(2).
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on appeal.107 Consequently, a guilty plea sacrifices the defendant’s right to
appeal independent constitutional violations that occurred prior to the entry
of the guilty plea.108 Later, the Court clarified the rule when it stated that a
guilty plea does not waive all prior constitutional violations.109 It explained
that several violations do survive a guilty plea and can be appealed after the
taking of the plea, most notably those mentioned in Blackledge and Menna.110
In Class, the Court took up the plea bargain issue again and what could
be waived by a defendant and what constitutional rights are left after the
guilty plea.111 Class ended up expanding the Menna-Blackledge doctrine,
holding that a defendant has the right under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to contest certain issues on appeal even if the
defendant entered an unconditional guilty plea, adding that a guilty plea does
not bar a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of
their statute of conviction on direct appeal.112 The holding by the Court
expanded the Rule 11 exception by adding Class to the doctrine. The MennaBlackledge doctrine is the only recognized exception in Rule 11, and by
adding Class to the doctrine, the majority of the Court expanded it and
diverged further away from the Court’s precedent set by the Brady Trilogy
and Tollett.113
B. Discussion
1. Class is part of the Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 11
exception in dealing with the waiver of rights of a defendant
within a plea agreement.
At the time Class was decided, the general rule of the Supreme Court
regarding plea bargains was the Brady Trilogy, which held that a defendant
who plead guilty waived a variety of important constitutional claims, and the
Menna-Blackledge doctrine dealt only with specific factual issues. Justice
Alito asserted in his dissent that Blackledge and Menna diverged from the
Court’s prior decisions alluding that they were a narrow exception to the
rule.114 Class essentially falls within the category of cases that adhere to the
narrow exception of the plea bargain rule that conclude a conviction under an
107. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266-67.
108. Id. at 267.
109. Menna, 423 U.S. at 63, n.2.
110. See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 28 (right to not be deterred from exercising their right to appeal by
having a greater charge tacked on); Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 (right to the constitutional claim of double
jeopardy).
111. See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 803.
112. Id. at 805.
113. Id. at 809.
114. Id. at 809.
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unconstitutional statute constitutes a constitutional jurisdictional defect, and
that a facial challenge could be raised for the first time on appeal.115 The
difference between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional defects is beyond the
scope of this note, but Class still falls within the narrow exception that a
defendant who plead guilty has the right to challenge their conviction on
appeal based on an argument that the statute was unconstitutional.
In support of the narrow exception to the plea bargain rule, two rationales
have been offered: (1) American law prohibits the conviction and punishment
of a person convicted under an unconstitutional statute and (2) appellate
courts are in as a good position as the lower courts to review a purely legal
question.116 First, an unconstitutional statute affects the foundation of the
whole proceeding, and a court can only convict under a constitutional
statute.117 The idea that a defendant could go to jail based on a conviction, or
guilty plea, secured under an unconstitutional statute simply because the issue
was raised for the first time on appeal is contrary to the entire legal system.118
Second, it has been argued that the appellate courts are as in a good position
as the lower courts to hear the constitutional claims because a trial judge will
rarely declare a statute unconstitutional and prosecutors will rarely concede
the statute is unconstitutional.119 The Supreme Court has lent some support
to the narrow exception with the Menna-Blackledge doctrine, but it is
doubtful that Class will move the doctrine into an exception of the general
rule, but will remain in the narrow exception.120
Class will likely not push the Menna-Blackledge doctrine into a general
exception because the case was decided on case-specific factual issues.
Blackledge and Menna were both decided on case specifics and not on a
generalized rule. Blackledge was based on a vindictive prosecutor changing
the indictment to a harsher penalty because Blackledge asserted his right to
the trial de novo.121 Menna was decided because the defendant twice refused
to testify to a grand jury, setting up Double Jeopardy.122 Class, as noted, is
based on a claim that the statute in question was unconstitutional and
therefore the Government did not have the authority to prosecute him.123

115. Ryan Walters, Comment, Raise It or Waive It? Addressing the Federal and State Split in
Authority on Whether a Conviction Under an Unconstitutional Statute is a Jurisdictional Defect, 62
BAYLOR L. REV. 909, 935 (2010).
116. Id. at 936.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 937.
119. See Walters, supra note 115, at 938.
120. Id. at 938-39.
121. See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 22-23.
122. See Menna, 423 U.S. at 61-62.
123. See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805.
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All three cases were decided on factual issues, while Justice Alito’s
dissent points out that the Court’s precedent is based on a rule that lower
courts can follow—that rule being when a defendant pleads guilty, they waive
certain rights, and some of those rights are the right to appeal certain
claims.124 Class does not follow that rule. It allows appeal of a claim that the
statute of conviction was unconstitutional—a fact that would be specific to
the case and not to a general rule.125
Therefore, Class may expand the Menna-Blackledge doctrine by adding
another specific incident of a right that is not waived with a guilty plea, but
essentially it does little to push or emphasize an exception to the general rule,
falling into the Menna-Blackledge exception, leaving the Brady Trilogy as
the existing rule because it can apply in most cases; that a defendant who
plead guilty waived all constitutional rights and defenses.126 It is an easier
and more simplified rule for courts to follow which would leave the impact
of Class on plea bargaining to a minimal.127
2. Effect of Class on Plea Bargains
Since the decision was handed down on February 21, 2018, the impact of
Class on the judicial and criminal system has been slow. Only a handful of
cases have mentioned Class and only one has had to directly deal with it.128
In Lee v. United States,129 the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona gave a great analysis of the effect that Class has had on the system.130
Class turned on deciding when claims based on antecedent constitutional
violations are automatically waived by a guilty plea, and when they are not.131
The court quoted the holding that the Supreme Court concluded when a claim
challenges the Government’s power to criminalize the defendant’s admitted
conduct, and thereby call into question the Government’s power to
constitutionally prosecute him, “a guilty plea does not bar a direct appeal.”132
The court went on and emphasized most constitutional challenges do
continue to be waived by an unconditional guilty plea.133 The issue in Lee
124. See generally id. at 809 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing how prior Court precedent was easy
to understand).
125. See generally id. at 816 (Alito, J., dissenting) (concluding that Class dealt with a specific issue
like the cases of Blackledge and Menna and that he, Justice Alito, would limit the Court’s ruling to case
specific analysis and not a broad principle).
126. See generally Walters, supra note 115, at 935-40 (discussing the minority approach to
unconditional waivers within a guilty plea).
127. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 809 (Alito, J., dissenting)
128. See infra notes 132-49 and accompanying text.
129. Lee v. United States, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113441 (D. AZ. July 6, 2018).
130. Id. at 20.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 20-21.
133. Lee, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113441 at 21.
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was the plea agreement contained an explicit waiver, 134while in Class, the
plea agreement did not contain an explicit waiver and the Government
conceded that it did not.135 In contrast, the Government in Lee had not
explicitly conceded that the defendant’s explicit waiver did not extend to the
claims he raised in his Motion to Vacate.136 The court in Lee then concluded
that nothing in Class held that such a waiver could not be made or would be
unenforceable.137
The court in Lee added to its analysis by mentioning that counsel had not
been able to identify any circuit court cases that have explicitly applied Class
to refuse enforcement of an explicit waiver in a plea agreement.138 The court
went on to mention several cases and their application of Class. First, United
States v. Bacon139 applied Class to permit a challenge but found no explicit
waivers.140 Next in United States v. St. Hubert,141 the Eleventh Circuit
applied Class to permit challenge, but with no explicit waiver identified.142
The Lee court noted that one Ninth Circuit case at least approached the issue
presented in Class in United States v. Obak.143
The Ninth Circuit addressed a pleading defendant’s venue challenge,
concluding that the claim would have been waived by entry of the guilty plea,
but the Government waived the defense by failing to raise it.144 In a footnote,
the Ninth Circuit observed that the defendant had, in the plea agreement,
explicitly waived various constitutional rights and the right to an appeal or
collateral attack, but the defendant failed to raise any of them on appeal.145
The court in Obak concluded that the Supreme Court in Class did not change
the result.146 Turning back to the court in Lee, they surmised that the Ninth
Circuit decision could be read as recognition that Class did not affect the
enforceability of explicit waivers.147 Lastly, the Lee court found a District
Court case that directly addressed the issue in Class which held that it did not
alter the enforceability of explicit waivers.148

134. Id.
135. Class, 138 St. C. at 807.
136. Lee, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113441, at 21.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. United States v. Bacon, 884 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2018).
140. See id.
141. United States v. St. Hubert, 883 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2018).
142. See id.
143. See United States v. Obak, 884 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2018).
144. Id. at 937.
145. Id at n.1.
146. Id.
147. Lee, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113441, at 22.
148. See Khan v. United States, CR No. 12-2901 RB/CG; CV No. 17-0744 RB, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92934, at 35 (D.N.M. May 31, 2018).
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The court in Lee concluded its analysis of the effect that Class has had by
noting that the Ninth Circuit has had a longstanding enforcement of explicit
waivers that extend beyond the claims waived by the guilty plea, and the
limited decision in Class does not prevent the enforcement of explicit waivers
of pre-existing challenges to the conviction, even if based on the
unconstitutionality of the statute of conviction.149 Therefore, the impact of
Class has not been dramatic.
3. Effect of Class Going Forward
Noting how courts have dealt with Class since the decision was handed
down, it seems that Class has not had a major impact. Lee and all the
subsequent circuit court decisions have hinted that the only impact Class is
likely to have is that U.S. Attorneys will push to include expressed waivers
in future plea bargains. The circuit courts discussed above have not directly
dealt with Class but instead have gone to lengths to prove that it did not apply
in their situation.150 The courts shied away from a direct confrontation with
Class and decided to steer around it.151 The long-term effect will likely not
be seen in the courts but at the plea bargain tables, where prosecutors and
defense attorneys bargain away the rights of the defendant. It is in those
bargaining rooms and phone calls that Class’ impact will happen.
The Ninth Circuit, noted above, held the decision in Class did not
prevent the enforcement of explicit waivers of pre-existing challenges to the
conviction, even if based on the unconstitutional statute of conviction.152
Over 95% of all criminal cases are decided with a plea bargain because the
system is back logged, and attorneys have more cases than they can handle.153
Explicit waivers will become even more important at the bargaining table.154
The idea of a plea bargain is to provide efficiency and quick resolution to the
case for both the defendant and the State.155 Allowing defendants to appeal
convictions after a guilty plea adds increased burdens to the system and does
not quickly resolve the case.156 Therefore, U.S. Attorneys will push harder
during the plea bargaining for more explicit waivers, including the waiver of
the right to appeal.

149. Lee, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113441, at 23.
150. See generally Lee, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113441, at 21-23 (explaining how only the Ninth
Circuit decision in Obak came close to addressing the holding in Class, but no other circuit had been
identified as applying Class).
151. Id.
152. Lee, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113441, at 23.
153. See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 807, see also Reimelt, supra note 100, at 881.
154. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 807.
155. See Walters, supra note 115, at 934.
156. Id.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol45/iss1/10

16

Williams: Class v. United States 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018)

2019]

CLASS V. UNITED STATES

299

The defendant may choose to waive certain rights as part of their plea
agreement.157 Any right can be waived, as long as it is knowing and
voluntary, unless specifically prohibited by statute.158 The waiver of the right
to appeal has been upheld as a valid provision of a plea agreement.159 Class
held that the waiver would not be valid if there was a showing that
constitutional due process safeguards were missing.160 Therefore, the effect
of Class on plea bargains will likely result in more defendants waiving their
right to appeal.
V. CONCLUSION
Plea bargains are a crucial aspect to criminal law. While not mandated,
they serve the greater purpose of promoting efficiency and quick resolution.
The decision in Class has expanded the narrow exception to Rule 11
surrounding plea bargains by adding a new dimension to the MennaBlackledge doctrine. While Class and those decisions of the doctrine dealt
with factual issues, the holding from the case will not have a great impact on
the lower courts or the plea-bargaining process. The general rule that
defendants can waive their rights upon a guilty plea as long as it is knowingly
and voluntarily agreed to will continue to be the normal procedure.
JEFF WILLIAMS

157. 6 CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 116.01 (ROBERT M. CIPES et al. eds., Matthew Bender
& Co., 2018).
158. Id.
159. See Reimelt, supra note 100, at 875.
160. See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805.
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